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Abstract
This paper studies an analytically tractable model of the formation and evolution of chains of
production. Over time, entrepreneurs accumulate techniques to produce their good using goods
produced by other entrepreneurs and labor as inputs. The value of a technique depends on both
the productivity embodied in the technique and the cost of the particular input; when producing,
each entrepreneur selects the technique that delivers the best combination. The collection of
known production techniques form a dynamic network of potential chains of production: the
input-output architecture of the economy. Aggregate productivity depends on whether the
lower cost rms are the important suppliers of inputs. When the share of intermediate goods
in production is high, the lower cost rms are selected as suppliers more frequently. This raises
aggregate productivity and also increases the concentration of sales of intermediate goods.
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All mistakes are my own.Why do some rms have a lower cost of production? One possibility is that a rm is technically
ecient: it is good at transforming inputs into output. Alternatively, a rm could have access to
a supplier that provides particularly cheap inputs. When inputs are cheap, output is inexpensive
to produce even if production is not ecient. Having a low cost of production depends not just
on what the rm knows, but on who it knows. If nding a low-cost supplier is important, much of
what we think of as aggregate productivity is comprised of relationships that link entrepreneurs.
This paper develops a model of the formation and evolution of input-output links. In the model,
entrepreneurs search for the most cost-eective techniques to produce their goods and for new uses
for their goods. It is based on the premise that there may be multiple ways to produce a good,
each using a dierent set of inputs.1 When one entrepreneur meets another, she may develop a new
technique for producing her good using the other entrepreneurs's good as an input. When deciding
which technique to use, an entrepreneur cares both about the technical eciency of the technique
and about the cost of the inputs. If she can charge a lower price, other entrepreneurs are more
likely to use her good as an input. As new techniques are discovered and as suppliers adjust their
prices, entrepreneurs substitute across methods of production.
The collection of known production techniques form a dynamic network comprising the set of
supply chains available to make each nal product. When an entrepreneur discovers a new, more
cost eective technique, the cost savings diuse through the network. How large those eects
are and how quickly these more ecient techniques are developed hinge on both the density and
structure of the network.2
1For example, an electricity producer may have a production technique that uses oil as an input and another less
productive technique that uses coal.
2Consider an entrepreneur who discovers an extremely cost eective technique. If the rm has many potential
customers (i.e., there are many other rms that have techniques that use the entrepreneur's good as an input), those
lower prices will ripple down many supply chains. If, however, the rm has few potential customers, the lower prices
may not have much of an immediate impact.
1I rst study a planner's problem in an economy in which new techniques arrive randomly to
all entrepreneurs at a uniform rate. For this baseline case, there is a closed form expression for
aggregate productivity, relating features of the network (and parameters that shape the network)
to aggregate output. An important determinant of aggregate productivity is whether the lower cost
producers are able to become the important suppliers of the economy. To become an important
supplier, a rm must have many potential customers who know how to use the rm's good and to
be able to charge those potential customers a relatively low price. When intermediate goods are
more important in production (relative to labor), the ability to charge a low price becomes more
important in winning customers, and the lowest cost rms are more likely to become superstar
suppliers. This increases aggregate productivity and also increases the market concentration in
sales of intermediate goods.
To better understand what determines the emergence of superstar suppliers, I study a simple
extension that allows for heterogeneous rates of link formation across dierent subgroups. The
particular conguration determines how productivity and demand covary and hence how frequently
the lowest cost rms are selected to supply intermediate goods. Concentration of link formation
among a subset of rms, e.g., in a city, leads to positive correlation of productivity and demand
across subgroups and hence higher aggregate output.
A nal extension allows for production functions that use multiple inputs. Raising the number
of inputs makes the cross sectional distribution of marginal cost more concentrated and dampens
the impact of superstar suppliers.
I then study equilibria of a particular market structure with monopolistic competition in sales
of nal goods and bilateral two part pricing between all potential input-output pairs. I consider
the set of pairwise stable equilibria: arrangements for which no there are no protable unilateral or
2pairwise deviations. For each of these equilibria, all rms set the marginal price equal to marginal
cost (along a non-negative xed fee) so production chains avoid double marginalization. There
are many equilibria that decentralize the planner's optimal allocation but dier in how prots are
divided across rms. There is also always at least one equilibrium in which no production occurs
(although there is a sense in which that equilibrium is fragile).
This paper relates to several disparate literatures. Most directly connected is the literature on
social networks, especially as applied to rms. Atalay et al. (2011) document cross-sectional facts
about input-output links, while Chaney (2011) discusses the network structure of international
shipments of goods. Both explain their empirical ndings using extensions of the preferential
attachment models of Barabasi and Albert (1999) and Jackson and Rogers (2007). Relative to
this literature, this paper makes three contributions. First, this paper endogenizes the formation of
observed input-output links in the economy. Each entrepreneur selects a supplier from among many
potential suppliers, and these choices are mediated by prices. In the preferential attachment model,
the formation of links is mechanical: no choices are made. The endogeneity of network formation is
advantageous in that it opens the door to the analysis of policy experiments that change incentives
and thus the link formation process. Second, in this model the network structure determines
not just the distribution of input-output links but also both rm level and aggregate productivity,
providing a more clear connection between the network structure and economic variables of interest
such as aggregate output and welfare. Third, this paper gives a natural alternative explanation for
a skewed cross-sectional distribution of input-output links.
The model emphasizes technological interdependence in the spirit of Rosenberg (1979)3. In
3\The social payo of an innovation can rarely be identied in isolation. The growing productivity of industrial
economies is the complex outcome of large numbers of interlocking, mutually reinforcing technologies, the individ-
ual components of which are of very limited economic consequence by themselves. The smallest relevant unit of
observation is seldom a single innovation but, more typically, an interrelated clustering of innovations."
3trying to make sense of the black box that is aggregate productivity, this paper provides a structure
that connects features of technological relationships to an aggregate production function and to
cross sectional characteristics of rms.
The structure of the model is also related to the work of Kortum (1997), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Alvarez et al. (2008), and Lucas (2009) who study 
ows of ideas. The most closely connected
is Lucas (2009), who studies a model in which individuals learn ideas from other individuals over
time.
The idea that network structure determines how shocks propagate through an economy has been
incorporated into the real business cycle literature, centered around the model of Long and Plosser
(1983). Recently, the discussion has focused on whether shocks to particularly well connected
sectors can account for aggregate 
uctuations.4 These models typically assume that each sector
has a representative rm that produces using a Cobb-Douglas production function, using inputs
from all other sectors.5 Like these models, this paper is concerned with how cost savings spill
over to other rms through input-output links. However, while that literature has focused on the
consequences of sectoral shocks taking the input-output structure as given, this paper studies the
endogenous formation and evolution of the input-output structure.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the basic technology, setting up and solving
a social planner's problem. In this section there are simple formulas relating the density of the
network to aggregate output. Section 2 describes the size distribution. Section 3 discusses market
structures that could be overlaid on the economic environment. Section 4 generalizes the model
4See Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999), Carvalho (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2010), and Foerster et al. (2008). This
literature has focused on the sectoral level both because the most ne input-output data is at that level and because
solving these models involves inverting matrices, which becomes computationally intensive as the number of nodes
in the network grows large.
5Jones (2008) uses a similar model to argue the input-output structure can help us understand cross country
income dierences. In that setup misallocation in one sector raises input prices in other sectors, and the magnitude
of the overall eect depends on the input-output structure.
4presented in the rst section to multiple types to allow for more interesting network congurations,
while Section 5 studies how particular congurations relate to aggregate output. Section 6 extends
the model to allow for multiple inputs. Section 7 concludes.
1 The Baseline Model
1.1 Economic Environment
There is a unit mass of innitely-lived rms, and each rm is associated with producing a particular
good. Each good is used for nal consumption and potentially can be used as an intermediate input
by other rms. A representative consumer has Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over the goods and supplies
labor inelastically (both of these can easily be relaxed). There is no storage technology.
Over time, each rm accumulates production techniques. For a rm, a technique is method
of producing its good using some other rm's good as an intermediate input. Each technique
 = fj;i;zg consists of three components: (i) the good that is produced, j; (ii) the good used
as an input, i; and (iii) a production technology associated with using that input, indexed by the
productivity parameter z:
y =
1
(1   )1 zxL1 
where y is the quantity of output of good j produced, x is the quantity of good i used as an input,
L is labor.
Time is continuous and rms discover and lose access to techniques randomly over time. Each
rm discovers new techniques at the arrival rate ~ (t). When rm j discovers a new technique,
 = fj;i;zg the identity of the supplier i is random and uniformly distributed across all rms in
5the economy.6 The productivity parameter, z, of a technique is drawn from a xed distribution
with CDF H() and is constant over time. It is assumed that the support of H is bounded below
by some z0 > 0 and that
R 1
z0 log(z)dH(z) < 1. Each existing technique becomes infeasible at rate
.7
Given a menu of techniques and input prices, each rm produces using the technique that
delivers the best combination of input cost and productivity. Since the production functions exhibit
constant returns to scale, generically using a single technique is optimal.8
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(b) Techniques that are Used
Figure 1: A Graphical Representation of the Input-Output Structure
Figure 1a shows the set of techniques at a point in time. Each node is a rm, and an edge
that connect two nodes corresponds to a technique. The direction indicates which rm produces
the output, and which rm produces the output. Each edge has a weight associated with the
productivity of the technique. In Figure 1b the solid arrows are techniques that are currently
used, while the dashed arrows correspond to techniques that are not.
At a point in time, the state of the economy can be summarized by the set of available techniques,
(t). Figure 1 gives a visual representation of this set as a weighted, directed graph. In the gure,
6Section 4 relaxes this uniformity.
7 plays a minor role in the analysis and setting  = 0 would change little. It is included (i) for generality and (ii)
so that when ~ (t) is constant there is a well dened steady state.
8In principle a rm could produce using more than one technique. In the analysis I will assume without loss that
each rm uses only a single technique.
6rms are represented by nodes. Each technique is represented by an edge or link connecting two
nodes. Each edge has a direction that corresponds to the 
ow of goods for the technique, indicating
which rm provides the intermediate input and which produces the output. In addition, each edge
has a weight (a number) corresponding to the productivity of the technique.
Figure 1a shows the set of all available techniques. Note that several rms, C, D, and E, each
have knowledge of multiple techniques that use dierent producers. In equilibrium they will each
select a single technique with which to produce. Figure 1b gives an example of these selections.
Over time the network will evolve as new techniques are discovered and some old techniques
become infeasible. While the productivity of a technique is constant over time, the attractiveness
of a technique varies with the cost of the associated inputs.
1.2 A Planner's Problem
Throughout Section 1 I will focus on a planner's problem in order to build intuition about the
economic environment and to describe solution techniques without getting bogged down with the
details of a particular market structure. There are many market structures that could be layered
on top of the technological environment. In Section 3 I discuss a particular market structure that
decentralizes the planner's solution.
Consider the problem of a planner that takes the network of techniques as given. At each point
in time the planner makes production decisions and allocates labor to maximize the instantaneous
utility of the representative agent. To increase readability time subscripts will be suppressed when
unnecessary. Let y0
j be production of good j for nal consumption. Given the set of existing
techniques, , we can dene two subsets relevant for each rm: let S
j be the set of techniques
available to produce good j (potential suppliers for rm j) and let B
j be the set of techniques that
7would use good j as an input (potential buyers of good j). For a technique  = fj;i;zg, dene the
following quantities:
 z() is the productivity parameter associated with the technique.
 s() is the identity of the supplier, in this case i.
 b() is the identity of the buyer, in this case j.
The planner selects a technique for rm j to use, 
j, from among the available techniques to
produce good j, S
j . With that, the planner chooses how much of good j to produce, yj, a quantity
of labor, Lj, and the quantity of inputs of good s(j) to use.
Formally, the planner chooses an allocation
n

j;y0
j;yj;xj;Lj
o
j2J
to maximize nal consump-
tion:
max
Z
j2J
(y0
j)
"
" 1
 "
" 1
subject to: (i) technological constraints
yj 
1
(1   )1 z(
j)x
j L1 
j ; 8j 2 J
(ii) goods feasibility constraints
y0
j +
X
2B
j j=
b()
xb()  yj 8j 2 J
and (iii) a labor resource constraint
Z
j2J
Lj  L
8The left hand side of the second constraint for good j consists of the uses of the good: output
for nal consumption and for use as an intermediate input in other rms' production.
Let MCj be the marginal social cost of producing good j (the multiplier on the goods feasibility
constraint for j), and let w be the marginal social cost of labor (the multiplier on the labor resource
constraint). The rst order necessary conditions from this problem imply that for each j,
MCj
w
= min
2S
j
1
z()

MCs()
w

(1)
For each technique , 1
z()

MCs()
w

gives the marginal social cost of producing good j using that
technique, with the planner using the one that delivers the lowest marginal social cost.
It will be convenient to dene qj  1
MCj as a measure of the eciency of producing good j. If
we choose units of utility so that w = 1, we can rewrite equation (1) as
qj = max
2S
j
z()q
s() (2)
1.3 The Supply Chain Interpretation
Given the structure of the network, we can back out the production technology used by the social
planner to produce each good. We consider here how labor is allocated across the dierent stages
of production in the supply chain for each good.
For a given good, say j, the planner uses a particular chain of techniques to produce good j.
Let f012:::g denote the chain of techniques for good j, with 0 being furthest downstream (the
technique actually used by rm j).
Let  Lj be total amount of labor used in production of good j for nal consumption (given
9constant returns to scale in production, this is well dened). Also let Lk
j be the labor used in the
kth to last stage of production of good j for nal consumption, so that L0
j is the labor used by rm
j to produce for nal consumption (as opposed to for production of the good for intermediate use).
Aggregating across stages gives  Lj =
P1
k=0 Lk
j.
The rst order conditions imply that Lk+1
j = Lk
j: the labor used at each stage is a constant
fraction of the labor used in the subsequent stage. We can therefore write
 Lj =
1 X
k=0
Lk
j =
1 X
k=0
kL0
j =
1
1   
L0
j
We also have the rst order condition y0
j = 1
1 qjL0
j, so that
y0
j = qj  Lj (3)
In a sense equation (3) should not be surprising; qj was dened to be the ratio of the marginal
social cost of producing good j and the marginal social cost of labor, or the eciency with which
the planner can produce good j in units of labor.
We can derive a more basic interpretation of equation (3) in terms of more fundamental objects
in the model. With similar notation, we can dene qk
j to be the eciency of the kth to last rm
in the chain of production for good j, and z(k) to be the productivity parameter of the technique
in the kth step. This means that along the supply chain for good j, qk
j = z(k)

qk+1
j

. By
10denition, q0
j = qj, so we make repeated substitutions to get
qj = q0
j = z(0)
 
q1
j
 = z(0)

z(1)
 
q2
j

= :::
=
1 Y
k=0
z(k)k
The planner therefore faces a production function describing the social cost of producing good nal
j:
y0
j =
"
1 Y
k=0
z(k)k
#
 Lj (4)
The eciency with which the planner can produce good j depends on the productivity of each
technique at each step in the supply chain, with the techniques furthest downstream weighted
more heavily.
1.4 The Allocation of Labor and Welfare
We now use several more rst order conditions from the planners problem to arrive at an expression
for total nal consumption. Dene Q 
R
J q" 1
j
 1
" 1, a standard productivity aggregator for
economies with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The rst order conditions with respect to each y0
j imply
y0
j
Y 0 =

qj
Q
"
. We can now use the labor resource constraint and equation (3) to write
L =
Z
J
 Lj =
Z
J
y0
j
qj
=
Z
J
Y 0Q "q" 1
j = Y 0=Q (5)
or more conveniently
Y 0 = QL (6)
To solve for aggregate output, we need to characterize rms' eciencies. One could use equa-
11tion (2) to create an operator on fqjgj2J and look for a xed point.9 However, with a continuum of
rms, this is neither computationally feasible nor would it be particularly illuminating. We proceed
to impose more structure on the set of techniques motivated by the dynamics of the model.
1.5 The Cross Sectional Distribution of Eciency
To this point, the treatment of the network of techniques has been quite general. In this section
we impose the probabilistic structure of the dynamic model in order to more clearly characterize
the solution to the planner's problem. In particular, we will set up a xed point problem for the
cross sectional distribution of eciency.
There are two important elements for characterizing the distribution. The rst is how techniques
are distributed across rms. The second is the distribution of eciency delivered by each technique.
We characterize each in turn.
1.5.1 The Distribution of Techniques
Here we describe how techniques are distributed across rms and how this distribution evolves.
Roughly, given the history of Poisson arrival rates of new techniques and decay rates of existing
techniques, the fraction of rms with n techniques at time t can be fully described by a Poisson
distribution with a mean ~ (t).
More formally, let !(n;t) be the fraction of rms with access to n techniques at time t. Over
9Taking logs of both sides gives an operator T, where the jth element of T (flogqjgj2J) is max2B
j flogz() +
logqs()g. T satises monotonicity and discounting. If the support of z were bounded above, the operator would be
a contraction on the appropriate bounded function space. If the eciencies fqjgj2J can take values on the extended
real line, then the mapping will not be a contraction. Indeed, there may be multiple xed points, as discussed below.
12time, this evolves according to the following law of motion:
_ !(n;t) = ~ (t)!(n   1;t) + (n + 1)!(n + 1;t)   ~ (t)!(n;t)   n!(n;t) (7)
!(n;t) increases when a rm with n   1 techniques discovers a new one and when a rm with
n + 1 techniques loses one of their n + 1 techniques. Similarly !(n;t) decrease when a rm with n
techniques either gains a new technique or loses one of its n techniques.
If at some t0 the distribution of n is given by a Poisson distribution with mean ~ (t0), then a
solution to equation (7) is such that at any time t > t0, the distribution of n will also follow a
Poisson distribution with mean ~ (t), where ~ (t) satises the dierential equation:10
_ ~ (t) = ~ (t)   ~ (t) (8)
To interpret this, it helps to take the limit as t0 !  1 (and imposing that limt0! 1 ~ (t0) is
bounded) giving
~ (t) =
Z t
 1
e (t )~ ()d
This is closely related to the fact that the sum of independent Poisson random variables is also
a Poisson random variable. The takeaway from this is that regardless of history of arrival rates
(f~ ()gt), the cross-sectional distribution of techniques !(n;t) at a given point in time can be
summarized by a single number, ~ (t). Since ~ (t) is also the average number of techniques per rm,
I will refer to it as the density of techniques in the network.
10In fact, for an arbitrary initial distribution, the distribution of links will converge asymptotically to Poisson
distribution.
131.5.2 The Cross Sectional Distribution of Eciency
Let F(q) be the fraction of rms with eciency no greater than q given the decisions of the planner.
This is an endogenous object that will need to be solved for. The strategy is to use the fact that
each potential supplier has eciency no greater than q with probability F(q) to set up a xed point
problem for F.
If rm j discovers a single technique , there are two parts that determine how useful it is:
a productivity parameter, z, drawn from an exogenous distribution H(z), and the eciency of
the supplier, qi. Recall from equation (2) that if rm j produces using technique  = fj;i;zg, j
will produce at eciency qj = z()q
i . Let G(q) be the cumulative distribution of the eciency
delivered by a single random technique. Given equation (2), we can write G(q) as
G(q) =
Z 1
0
F
q
z
 1


dH(z) (9)
To interpret this, note that for each z, F
 q
z
 1


is the portion of potential suppliers that, in
combination with that z, would leave the rm with eciency no greater than q.
We now ask, what is the probability that, given all of its techniques, a rm has eciency no
greater than than q? We can write this as
Pr(qj  q) =
1 X
n=0
Pr(All n draws are  q)! (n)
=
1 X
n=0
G(q)
n ~ ne ~ 
n!
= e ~ [1 G(q)]
14To interpret this last expression, if ~ [1   G(q)] is a parameter of a Poisson distribution (the arrival
rate of techniques that would provide eciency better than q), then e ~ [1 G(q)] is the probability
that no such techniques arrived.
When the number of rms is large, a standard abuse of the law of large numbers gives Pr(qj  q) =
F(q).11 We can substitute the expression for G(q) from equation (9) to get a xed point problem
for the distribution of eciency F(q):
F(q) = e
 ~ 
R 1
0

1 F

(
q
z)
1


dH(z)
(10)
This recursive equation is the key to solving the planner's problem.
1.6 Properties of the Planner's Solution
Consider the space  F of non-decreasing functions f : R+ 7! [0;1]. Consider the operator T on this
space dened as
Tf(q)  e
 ~ 
R 1
0

1 f

(
q
z)
1


dH(z)
With probability one the planner's solution will be a xed point of the operator T on  F.
The qualitative behavior of network depends on whether the average number of techniques ~  is
greater or less than 1. The more interesting case in which the average number of links exceeds one
will be the focus of this paper, but for completeness I will discuss both.
11The proof of Proposition 1 uses such a law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables described by
Uhlig (1996). To use this one must verify that rms' eciencies are pairwise uncorrelated. In the present context this
is not immediately obvious: it is possible that two rms' supply chains overlap or that one is in the other's supply
chain. However, by assumption the network is suciently sparse that with high probability the supply chains will
not overlap: there is a continuum of rms but only a countable number of those are in any of given rm's potential
supply chains. Therefore, for any two rms, the probability that their supply chains overlap is zero. The law of large
numbers then implies that equation (10) holds with probability one.
15If rm j does not have access to any techniques, it cannot produce. Similarly, if rm j has
techniques but its suppliers do not, then those suppliers will not be able to produce and consequently
neither will rm j. Continuing with this logic, if a supply chain is nite, it is not viable.
Consider the probability that a single rm will have access to at least one supply chain that
continues indenitely; only rms with access to such a supply chain will have positive eciency.
As shown in Appendix B the probability that a rm has no such chains is the smallest root  of
 = e ~ (1 ).12 For ~   1, the probability of no such chains is one, while for ~  > 1, the probability
is strictly less than one.13
Few Techniques: ~   1
If ~   1, there are so few techniques available that the probability that any individual rm has
access to a viable supply chain is zero. In this case one can show that T is a contraction, with the
unique solution f = 1: all rms produce with eciency 0.
Many Techniques: ~  > 1
As ~  crosses the critical value of 1, one can show that there are multiple xed points of the
operator T on  F (see Appendix C). Recall that the functional equation equation (10) was con-
structed from necessary (but not sucient) conditions to the planner's problem, so one must check
which of these solutions to equation (10) actually solves the planner's problem.
There are two solutions in which F(q) is constant for all q, both of which stem from the fact
that equation (10) is formulated as a recursive equation. The rst is F(q) = 1 for all q, which again
corresponds to zero eciency (innite marginal social cost) for all goods. However, the rationale
12There is a direct analogy between this problem and the Galton-Watson problem. Consider a world in which
every individual has a random number of children drawn from some xed distribution. The Galton-Watson problem
is: What is the asymptotic probability of extinction?
13The starkly dierent behavior of the network when ~  crosses 1 is called a phase transition. Such a phase transition
is a typical property of random graphs, a result associated with the Erdos-Renyi Theorem. See Kelly (1997) and
Kelly (2005) for examples in which this kind of phase transition is given an economic interpretation.
16is dierent than when ~   1; here, the logic is recursive. If the marginal social cost of every input
is innite, then the marginal social cost of each output must be innite as well. The allocation
that arises from this solution is feasible, but we will show that it is dominated by another feasible
allocation and is therefore not the solution to the planner's problem.
There is a second constant solution, F(q) =  2 (0;1), which follows a similar recursive logic.
This xed point implies innite marginal social cost for those rms that cannot produce, and zero
marginal social cost for all other rms. In other words, any rm with a viable supply chain has
innite eciency. The rationale is similar: if inputs have zero marginal social cost, output has zero
social cost. Unfortunately, this leads to an infeasible allocation, and is therefore not a solution to
the planners problem either.14
There is always a third xed point. In Appendix C a subset F   F is constructed along with
a partial ordering. The subset does not contain either of the two constant xed points. We can
show that there is a xed point of T using the Tarski xed point theorem, which also provides an
algorithm to numerically solve for such a xed point. Further we can show that the xed point is
unique. See Appendix C for a more complete statement of the theorem and a proof.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique xed point of T on F, Fsp. With probability one, Fsp is the
CDF of the cross sectional distribution of eciencies in the solution to the planner's problem and
aggregate productivity is Q =
 R 1
0 q" 1dFsp(q)
 1
" 1.
Multiple solutions to rst order necessary conditions of the planner's problem is actually a
feature of most models in which a portion of output is used simultaneously as input, such as
14These two constant solutions have further economic meaning. Given the distribution of productivity draws H()
with support [z;  z] with 0  z   z  1, let q and  q be the lowest and highest possible eciencies among rms that
are able to produce. q ( q) is derived from the supply chain in which every technique has the worst (best) possible
productivity draw, so that q = z
1
1  ( q =  z
1
1 ). If ~  > 1 the solution to the planners problem must have F( q) = 1
and F(q) = , the two constant solutions to equation (10).
17a standard growth model with roundabout production. If the same good enters a technological
constraint as both an input and an output, the Lagrange multiplier on that good will be on
both sides of a rst order condition. Consequently the rst order condition will be satised if the
Lagrange multiplier takes the value of zero or innity. One can usually sidestep this issue by nding
an alternative way to describe the production technology, e.g., solving for nal output as a function
of primary inputs. Much of the work in the proof of Proposition 1 is in nding and characterizing
such an alternative description of production possibilities.
1.7 A Parametric Assumption
I now describe a special case that proves to be analytically tractable. Assume that the productivity
parameter embodied in a technique is drawn from a Pareto distribution, H(z) = 1  

z
z0
 
,
with the restriction that  > "   1 so that nal output is nite. In addition, parameterize the
arrival rate (and initial condition) of techniques so that ~ (t) = (t)z
 
0 for all t which implies that
~ (t) = (t)z
 
0 .
With these assumptions we can compare economies with dierent values of z0 (holding f(t)g
xed). In an economy with a lower z0, there will be two dierences: and (ii) techniques have
stochastically lower productivity and (ii) each rm discovers new techniques more frequently. In
fact, the parameterization is such that varying z0 has no impact on the average number of techniques
with productivity above any threshold ^ z, ~ (1   H(^ z)): the two eects cancel exactly. The only
dierence is that with a lower z0 there are additional relatively unproductive techniques.
We then look at the limit of a sequence of economies as z0 ! 0. This adds many relatively
unproductive techniques (low z) to the economy without changing the number of productive tech-
niques (high z). In the limit, the measure of rms without access to any techniques goes to zero.
18In this special case, we can show that every solution F() to equation (10) follows a Frechet
distribution. To see this, note that we can use the change of variables x = (q=z)1= to write
1   G(q) =
Z 1
z0
H0(z)

1   F
q
z
 1


dz
=
Z

q
z0
 1

0
H0
 q
x

(1   F(x))qx  1dx
Using the functional form H0(z) = z

0z  1, we can then write
~ [1   G(q)] = z
 
0
Z

q
z0
 1

0
z

0
 q
x
  1
(1   F(x))qx  1dx
= q 
Z

q
z0
 1

0
x 1 (1   F(x))dx
For any F(), as z0 ! 0, this expression will clearly go to q  multiplied by a constant. Label this
constant , so that equation (10) can be written as F(q) = e q 
, the cumulative distribution of a
Frechet random variable. Note that the exponent  is the same as that of the Pareto distribution
H. This means that the distribution of eciencies F inherits the tail behavior of the distribution
of productivity draws, H.
We next solve for , which was dened to satisfy
 = 
Z 1
0
x 1 (1   F(x))dx
Integrating by parts gives
 = 
Z 1
0
xF0(x)dx
19Plugging in the functional form F(q) = e q 
and making the substitution s = x  gives
 = 
Z 1
0
s e sds
so that  satises15
 =  (1   ) (11)
where  () is the gamma function.
With this, we can compute Q, the relevant measure of welfare:
Q =
Z 1
0
q" 1dF(q)
 1
" 1
= 1= 

1  
"   1

 1
" 1
Putting these together, we get an expression for nal consumption:
Y =  

1  
"   1

 1
" 1
 (1   )
1
1 
1

1
1 
1
L (12)
There are several immediate implications. First, aggregate output is increasing in the density of
the network, . In a more densely populated network, rms on average have a larger set of supply
chains to choose from, and hence are more likely to have lower cost.
Second, the share of intermediate goods in production  plays two roles. First, as in other models
with roundabout production, it determines the extent to which lower prices of input cost feed back
into lower cost of production. This is the exponent 1
1  that appears in several places. Second,
 determines the likelihood that the lowest cost producers are selected as the actual suppliers of
15I write equation (11) in this form rather than solving directly for  in order to emphasize the fact that the
equation has three non-negative roots, two of which are zero and innity. In addition, in later sections it will be
easier to see parallels with the analogous expressions when this equation when written in this form.
20inputs. Recall that the eciency delivered by a single technique is zq, where z is the productivity
embedded in the technique and q is the eciency of supplier.  determines the relative impact
of each of these factors on the cost eectiveness of a technique, and consequently in the selection
of supplier. When  is high, the cost of the inputs matters more, which means the most ecient
producers are selected as suppliers more frequently. In other words, superstar suppliers will be
much more relevant for aggregate production when  is closer to one. Mathematically, this shows
up in the term  (1 ).16 Summarizing, when  is high, each supplier is able to pass through cost
savings to its customers at a higher rate and the most ecient rms are selected to be suppliers
more frequently, so that their high eciency can be passed through to a larger share of customers.
This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2
1.8 Dynamics
Over time, some rms discover new techniques while others substitute across techniques in response
to changes in cost along their supply chains. For aggregate quantities, however, all of these changes
can be summarized by changes in the density of the network, . All relevant aggregate dynamics
can be summarized by two equations
Y = 
1
1 
1
L
and
_ (t) = (t)   (t)
If the (normalized) arrival rate of new techniques (t) is constant over time (and if  > 0), then
16 (x) is decreasing on (0;1).  (1) = 1 and limx!0  (x) = 1.
21there is a steady state with
ss =


Alternatively if the arrival rate of new techniques is growing over time, say (t) = e
t, then
there is a balanced growth path (for any   0) with
_ 

= 
 and
_ Y
Y
=
1
1   
1



2 Size Distribution
Here I discuss two dimensions of the cross sectional distribution of size. First, I give expressions
for the conditional and unconditional distributions of the number of customers (other rms that
purchase intermediate goods). Second, I describe the cross sectional distribution of employment.
2.1 Number of Customers
Consider a single draw of a technique that uses rm i's good as an input. Given the rm's e-
ciency, qi, we can compute the probability that the technique is the potential buyer's best available
technique. To do this, we rst characterize the following object: For a potential customer that has
drawn a technique that uses i, what is the probability that it has no other techniques better that
deliver eciency better than q?
Given the Poisson distribution over the number of techniques, a rm will have n   1 other
techniques with probability e ~ ~ n
n!(1 e ~ ). The CDF of eciency delivered by each of these techniques
is G(q). We can therefore write the probability that the potential buyer has no other technique
22that delivers better than q, conditioning on having at least one technique, as:
P1
n=1
e ~ ~ n
n! G(q)n 1
1   e ~  =
1
G(q)(1   e ~ )
"
1 X
n=0
e ~ ~ n
n!
G(q)n   e ~ 
#
=
F(q)   e ~ 
G(q)(1   e ~ )
Among techniques that use i as a supplier, the fraction that deliver eciency less than q
is H

q
q
i

, with density 1
q
i H0

q
q
i

. We can now characterize the probability that a particular
technique is the potential buyer's best technique:
Pr( is usedjqi) =
Z 1
0
1
q
i
H0

~ q
q
i

F(~ q)   e ~ 
G(~ q)(1   e ~ )
d~ q
How many known techniques use a given rm as a potential supplier? In other words, how
many potential customers does a given supplier have? Across all rms, the distribution over the
number of potential customers follows a Poisson law with mean ~ . Each one of those techniques has
an equal chance of being the potential buyer's best technique, so the distribution over the number
of actual customers will also be a Poisson, with parameter:
~ 
Z 1
0
1
q
i
H0

~ q
q
i

F(~ q)   e ~ 
G(~ q)(1   e ~ )
d~ q
Using the functional form for H and taking the limit as z0 ! 0 yields

q

i

So among rms with eciency q, the distribution over the number of customers is a Poisson
23distribution with parameter 
q
 . One can see that the distribution among high eciency suppliers
rst order stochastically dominates the distribution among low eciency suppliers: high eciency
rms get more customers.
Figure 2 shows the average number of customers at each percentile in the eciency grouping
for dierent values of . As expected, higher eciency rms are able to attract more customers
than low eciency rms.
It is notable that curve in Figure 2 depends on only one parameter,  (the share of inputs in
production). This is because buyers choose to use the technique that gives the best combination of
eciency (z) and input cost (q).  determines the relative importance of these two factors. Recall
that the eciency associated with a single technique is zq. If  is large then the the share of
inputs is higher, and the cost of inputs becomes relatively more important. An increase in  makes
the techniques using high eciency suppliers even more cost eective. In contrast, when  is low,
more weight is put on the idiosyncratic productivity associated with the technique. Because the
productivity draws are drawn from the same distribution regardless of the eciency of the supplier,
lowering  increases the odds that a low eciency rm will be able to attract customers; the low
eciency becomes less relevant to its customers.
When  is higher, more weight is put on the cost of inputs, so the advantage of the high eciency
suppliers is even larger. The shift is evident in Figure 2: with higher , the high eciency rms
are capturing a much larger share of the customers, at the expense of the low eciency rms.17
We next look at the unconditional distribution over the number of customers among all rms. To
nd the mass of suppliers with n customers, we simply integrate over suppliers of each eciency.
The resulting formula is given in the following proposition, which also describes the tail of the
17It is easy to show a single crossing property: Curves for dierent values of  in Figure 2 cross exactly once.
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Figure 2: Conditional Distribution of Customers
The mean number of actual customers for each percentile in the eciency distribution.
distribution.
Proposition 2 Let pn be the mass of rms with n customers. Then
pn =
Z 1
0

w 
 (1 )
n
e
 

w 
 (1 )

n!
e wdw
The counter cumulative distribution has a tail index of 1=.
It is notable that the distribution of number of customers has only a single parameter, . In
particular the density of the network,  does not enter this equation. While a higher  raises the
number of potential customers for any rm, it also raises the number of alternatives available to
each of those potential customers.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of customers for dierent values of . When  is high, more
weight is put on the cost of inputs, so the distribution is more skewed. The tail is thicker, and but
there are also more rms without any customers. In contrast, when  is low, the middle of the
251 2 3 4 5
Customers
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
pmf
a = .1
a = .3
a = .5
a = .7
a = .9
(a) Number of Customers
2 5 10 20 50
Customers
10-47
10-37
10-27
10-17
10-7
pmf
a = .1
a = .3
a = .5
a = .7
a = .9
(b) Number of Customers, Log-Log
Figure 3: The Distribution of Customers
Figure 3a gives the mass of rms with n customers for several dierent values of the input share
. Figure 3b also gives the mass of rms with n customers, but on a log-log plot, to better show
the tail of the distribution.
distribution is thicker.
2.2 Comparison to Preferential Attachment
The preferential attachment model of Barabasi and Albert (1999) was designed to match the
scale free nature of the distribution of links in several real world networks. For example, relative
to a network in which links are formed randomly and with uniform probability, there are too
many websites with many incoming weblinks and also too many with very few incoming weblinks.
Roughly, the preferential attachment model explains this as follows: There is an initial network and
over time new links are formed and new rms are born. The probability that a new link involves
a particular rm is increasing in the number of links that rm already has.
This paper gives an alternative explanation for skewed cross-sectional distribution of input-
output links. Because entrepreneurs dier in productivity (some have more ecient supply chains
than others), they will also dier in their ability to attract customers. While the distribution of
potential customers is the same as one would expect in a uniformly random network, the distribution
26of actual customers is not. This is precisely because of endogenous selection: some of those rms
with many potential customers are able to oer lower prices and win over a larger fraction of those
potential customers.18
2.3 Distribution of Employment
In characterizing the cross sectional distribution of employment, we rst derive a convenient fact.
Let B (qjqi) be the the CDF of the eciency of customers of suppliers with eciency qi. In other
words, B (qjqi) is the distribution eciency among rms whose best technique uses a supplier with
eciency qi. We will show that in the limit as z0 ! 0, B (qjqi) = F(q). We can solve for this
distribution of customers' actual eciency with an application of Bayes rule:
B0 (qjqi) =
1
q
i H0

q
q
i

F(q) e ~ 
G(q)(1 e ~ )
R 1
0
1
q
i H0

~ q
q
i

F(~ q) e ~ 
G(~ q)(1 e ~ )d~ q
The numerator is the density of eciency delivered by techniques that use suppliers with qi,
1
q
i H0

q
q
i

, multiplied by the probability that a such a technique is the potential customer's best
technique. The denominator is the probability that a technique from i is the customer's best
technique. We can use the functional forms for H and take a limit as z0 ! 0:
lim
z0!0
B0 (qjqi) = lim
z0!0
z

0q

i q  1e q 
R 1
z0q
i z

0q

i ~ q  1e ~ q d~ q
= q  1e q 
= lim
z0!0
F0(q)
18There is an analogous comparison for the world wide web. The preferential attachment model says the
www.nytimes.com has many incoming links because it happened to have many such links initially, and consequently
many other websites linked to it as well. In contrast, a model with endogenous network formation would give the
explanation that www.nytimes.com oers better content than other sites, and therefore other sites choose to link to
it more frequently.
27This implies that knowing the eciency of a supplier gives no information about the identity
of its customer. That is, there are no systematic dierences between the customers of low and high
eciency suppliers.
This has two implications. First, it gives insight into the determinants of size. Aside from
more sales of nal goods, high eciency rms will on average be larger because they have more
customers, not because their customers are any bigger.
Second we can treat the characteristics of customers as independent, identically distributed
random variables. This will be helpful in several ways. Of particular use here is the fact that we
can treat the size of a customer as an IID random variable.
Distribution of Employment
We are interested in adding together the labor used to make goods for nal consumption and
for intermediate use for each customer. Since the latter can be treated as independent random
variables, it is easiest to work with characteristic functions of the relevant distributions.
Let (s) be the characteristic function associated with the cross sectional distribution of em-
ployment. To get at it, we will create a xed point problem. Roughly, the information that is used
includes:
 Given a rm's eciency, the quantity of labor used for production of nal output.
 Given a rm's eciency, the distribution over the number of actual customers.
 The fact that the quantity of labor used by a customer is independent of the eciency of the
supplier.
 The fact that if a customer uses L units of labor, the supplier will use L units of labor to
make the inputs for that customer.
28As described in Appendix D.2, the characteristic function solves the equation:
(s) =
Z 1
0
exp
8
<
:
is
t
  " 1

 

1   " 1

 (1   )L  
t 
 (1   )
[1   (s)]   t
9
=
;
dt (13)
There are several things to note. First, as L changes, the distribution of labor scales uniformly.19
Second the distribution depends on only two parameters,  and " 1
 . The share of intermediates
matters for the same reason as before, it determines the skew of the distribution of number of
customers. " 1
 is a composite of two parameters, the elasticity of substitution in nal consumption,
and , the tail index of both H() (the Pareto distribution from which productivity shocks are
drawn) and F() (the cross sectional distribution of eciency). In combination, these parameters
determine the tail index of the distribution of nal consumption. When  is small, the eciency
distribution has a thicker tail, inducing a thicker tail in the distribution of nal consumption. When
" is high, consumers are more willing to substitute toward low cost goods, also thickening the tail
of nal consumption.
Equation (13) can be used to solve for (s) numerically.20 We can consequently use standard
methods to back out the distribution of employment form its characteristic function.
Figure 4 shows the distribution for the parameters  = " 1
 = 1=2 and L = 1. One can see that
this density is quite skewed, with the mode well below the mean of 1.
19In fact, one could write the characteristic function associated with the fraction of labor used by each rm as
^ (s) = 
  1
Ls

. This satises
^ (s) =
Z 1
0
exp
8
<
:
is
t
  " 1

 

1  
" 1

 (1   )  
t
 
 (1   )
[1   ^ (s)]   t
9
=
;
dt
20While equation (13) is a functional equation, it resembles a dierence equation. One can solve this using a reverse
shooting algorithm, starting near the point (0) = 1 and interpolating.
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Figure 4: The Distribution of Employment
Figure 4a gives the density of employment with  =
" 1
 = 1=2. Figure 4b gives right CDF on
a log-log plot to show the shape of the tail of the distribution.
3 Market Structure and Decentralized Equilibria
We will consider a market structure in which there is monopolistic competition across nal goods
but bilateral two part taris for intermediate goods. In addition we will consider contracting
terms that are \pairwise stable."21 This equilibrium concept is reminiscent of Nash equilibrium,
except there is no explicit description of a formal game. We will characterize the set of contracting
arrangements for which the are no protable unilateral or mutually benecial pairwise deviations.
As an equilibrium concept, pairwise stability captures the dynamic spirit of the model. As new
techniques are found, some of the cost savings are passed on to downstream customers in the form
of lower prices. An important aspect of this is that when the terms of a contract are no longer
optimal, those terms can be renegotiated to re
ect the change in cost structure in the supply chain.
While the equilibrium denition is a static one, the motivation is inherently dynamic, and pairwise
21As an equilibrium concept, pairwise stability is used frequently in the networks literature (Jackson (2008) provides
an excellent survey). For many applications in this literature, payos are a function of the particular links that are
formed, and the idea is to nd a network of links for which no pair of nodes wish to change whether or not they
are connected (see Jackson (2003)). Here, the usual concept is extended to include contractual terms of trade in any
input output relationship.
30deviations capture the spirit of the renegotiation that would take place over time.22
One result will be that for each technique that is used in equilibrium, marginal price equals
marginal cost. While the space of possible contracts is fairly large, it seems reasonable to focus on
a space of contracts that allows for this possibility. Anything other than this kind of two part tari
would lead to double marginalization and leave surplus on the table. Input-output relationships
are generally long-lived, so it would be surprising if the contracting terms remained inecient. In
addition, the informational demands of these contracts (in equilibrium) are not large. Firms do
not need to know that much about the environment to get the terms of the contract right.23 While
these concerns are outside the model, they motivate the focus on two part pricing.
Monopolistic competition across nal goods leads to a uniform markup of "
" 1. This gives
surplus for each nal good that is divided across rms in that supply chain. We will show that
allowing for two part taris decentralizes the planner's solution: in this decentralization, the inputs,
outputs, and labor used by each rm are the same as the the ecient allocation. Each rm will
choose the technique that gives the best combination of cost/productivity. There are many ways
to divide the surplus from sales of nal goods across supply chains, but this is not relevant for the
allocation of resources. Since the marginal input price equals marginal cost, the quantity supplied
will be ecient, and since labor is supplied inelastically the monopoly markup on nal goods is not
22Another a solution concept, Nash bargaining, is tricky precisely because of renegotiation: there is no well dened
outside option. If a supplier i and buyer j are bargaining over the contract terms for a technique, it is natural that
if the bargaining breaks down j will use its next best supplier. However, if this happens, does j renegotiate with
its current contracts with its customers? More generally, the Nash bargaining solution requires well dened outside
options, and to do this would require a well dened order of negotiation and renegotiation across pairs of rms.
23Another consideration is that allowing for bilateral two part taris leads to a characterization of equilibrium that
is tractable. Consider an alternative in which rms set a single price for all customers. A diculty in solving for the
optimal prices in this world is that demand curves facing rms are not continuous let alone dierentiable, as lowering
a price a little may allow a supplier to beat out a competitor and give a spike in quantity demanded (or may allow
the buyer to lower its price enough to beat out its competitor, giving that buyer and consequently the supplier a
spike in quantity demanded). If two part taris are not available, solving for the optimal prices (and consequently
the allocation) is quite challenging.
31distortionary.24
3.1 Pairwise Stable Equilibrium
Here we dene a pairwise stable equilibrium. This has two stages. First an \arrangement" deter-
mines which techniques are used and pricing for each of those techniques. Second, rms set prices
of nal goods and select their input mix. In dening an arrangement, care is taken to ensure enough
structure so that payos after deviations are well dened.
Denition 1 An arrangement consists of the following:
(i) For each technique  2 (t), dene the triple fp();();A()g 2 R+  Rf0;1g.
p() and () are the price and xed part of a two part tari. A() = 1 implies that the
supplier associated with the technique, s(), is willing to supply goods at those terms, whereas
A() = 0 indicates she is not.
(ii) For each rm, j, a ordering of techniques. Formally, this is a bijective function Oj : S
j !
n
1;:::;

 B
j

 
o
.
Let 
j  argminf2S
j jA()=1g Oj() be the technique actually used by rm j in the arrange-
ment. This is jointly determined by the ordering Oj and the whether or not each of j's potential sup-
pliers are willing to accept the contracting terms of the arrangement. B
j 
n
 2 B
j j = 
b()
o
is the set of customers that use rm j's good as an input in the arrangement.
Given an arrangement, rms choose a price and quantity for nal output along with an input
mix to maximize prot. p0
jy0
j is revenue from nal output,
P
2B
j [p()x() + ()] is revenue from
output for use as an intermediate input, and 


j

+ p


j

x


j

is the cost of intermediates
24If labor were supplied elastically, the only dierences between the planner's allocation and the decentralized
equilibrium would be that less labor would be supplied because of the monopoly markups and all production would
scale down in proportion to the decrease in aggregate labor.
32inputs used in production. Prot for rm j is
j = max
p0
j;y0
j;L;x
p0
jy0
j +
X
2B
j
[p()x() + ()]   
 

j

  p
 

j

x   wL
subject to the technological constraints and a downward sloping demand curve for nal output:
y0
j +
X
2B
j
x() 
1
 (1   )
1 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 
B
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
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 
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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 
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Given an arrangement,
n
fp();();A()g2B
j ;Oj
o
j2J
, consider two types of deviations:
A unilateral deviation for rm j is an alternative order ^ Oj and/or an alternative acceptance
^ A() for each  2 B
j .
For a technique , a pairwise deviation is an alternative two part tari ^ p(); ^ (), an alterna-
tive acceptance for the supplier s() about whether to accept the contract, ^ A(), and an alternative
ordering for the buyer, ^ Ob().
Either of these types of deviations delivers an alternative arrangement, and hence alternative
payos.
Denition 2 A pairwise stable equilibrium is an arrangement
n
fp();();A()g2B
j ;Oj
o
j2J
,
rms choices,
n
p0
j;y0
j;xj;Lj
o
j2J
, and a wage w such that
 Given wages and prots, the nal consumers maximize utility.
 For each j 2 J,
n
p0
j;y0
j;xj;Lj
o
maximize rm j's prot given the arrangement, wages, and
the nal demand.
33 Labor and nal goods markets clear
 There are no unilateral deviations that would increase a rm's prot.
 There are no pairwise deviations that would increase each rms' prot.
Let q
pw
j be the eciency of rm j, equal to the wage divided by marginal cost. In Appendix E
we prove the following:
Proposition 3 In any pairwise stable equilibrium:
(i) For each technique that is actually used, price is equal to marginal cost, p


j

= w
q
pw
j
, and
the xed fee is nonnegative, 


j

 0;
(ii) q
pw
j = max2S
j z()

q
pw
s()

These conditions are the same as the necessary conditions to the planners problem. In fact,
there are many pairwise stable equilibria that decentralize the planner's solution. In each of these,
marginal costs are the same as in the planner's solution, but the various equilibria dier in the xed
part of the taris. In each of these equilibria, the markup in the sales of goods to the nal consumer
generates a prot for each good. This prot is then divided up across the supply chain to produce
that good according to the xed fees.25 Normally the markups would distort the consumption-
leisure margin, but since labor is supplied inelastically, the markup has no eect on the allocation
of goods and labor. Even if labor were elastic, all of these equilibria would generate the same
aggregate production function as the planner would choose.
There are additional equilibria which do not decentralize the planner's problem. For example,
there is always an equilibrium in which all rms set a price of innity (this corresponds to one of
25There is an upper limit to the fees that can be charged in equilibrium: they cannot be so high that the buyer
would nd it benecial to use an alternative supplier. Short of that limit, any nonnegative fee will do.
34constant xed points of equation (10)).
There is a sense in which that equilibrium is fragile (along with any others that might exist).
There is a slightly perturbed economic environment no such equilibrium exists. More specically,
consider adding to each rm's techniques a production function that uses only labor, y = qL, with
q common to all rms. In this environment we can provide a welfare theorem: every pairwise stable
equilibrium decentralizes the planner's solution.
Proposition 4 If q > 0, then with probability one Fsp = Fpw and Qsp = Qpw.
See Appendix E for proof. For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on equilibria that
decentralize the planner's allocation.
3.2 An Alternative Interpretation of the Model
An alternative interpretation of the model is that the technology embodied in a technique is non-
rival and freely available for others to replicate. In this interpretation, each good is produced by an
island of identical rms, and labor is perfectly mobile across islands. The state of technology can
still be represented as a network, but each node is an island of rms producing a single good rather
than an individual entrepreneur. Again, the network represents the input-output architecture of
the economy, but among islands of rms. In this interpretation perfect competition might be a
more natural benchmark with all prices are set at marginal cost. It is straightforward to show that
competitive equilibrium allocations correspond to those of pairwise stable equilibria.
354 Asymmetric Networks
The preceding analysis studied a very specic type of network, and leaves open the question of how
alternative network congurations would aect aggregate productivity. For example, if many rms
are in the center of a city and others are in the outskirts, how would aggregate productivity respond
to increased concentration? If some entrepreneurs were particularly active in nding new techniques
(and others particularly inactive), how would this change patterns of diusion of productivity gains
from newly discovered techniques?
To get at these, we rst extend the previous setup to allow for more interesting network con-
gurations. There are multiple types of rms, indexed by k 2 K. The only structural dierence
between rms of dierent types is how frequently they are involved with new techniques that are
discovered. Let Mt be the mass of each type k rms and, abusing notation, let K be the number
of types (in addition to the set of types).
The social planner's problem is exactly the same as in Section 1.2 and all rst order conditions
carry over. Instead of characterizing the distribution of eciency across all rms, it will be conve-
nient to characterize the distribution among rms of each type. Let Fk(q) be the fraction of type
k rms with eciency less than q. We proceed to characterize these distributions by setting up a
xed point problem.
We next dene several objects that have analogs in Section 1. !k(n;k0) is the fraction type k
rms that have access to n techniques with suppliers of type k0. At a given point in time this follows
a Poisson distribution with mean ~ k(k0). Let Gk(q;k0) be the distribution of eciency provided by
36a single technique drawn by a type k rm with supplier type k0. Gk(q;k0) is then:
Gk(q;k0) =
Z 1
0
Fk0
q
z
 1


dH(z)
Given Gk(q;k0), we can compute Pr(qj  qjj is type k), the probability that, given all of its
draws of techniques, a rm of type k has eciency no greater than q:
Pr(qj  qjj is type k) =
Y
k02K
1 X
n=0
!k(n;k0)Gk(q;k0)n = e 
P
k0 ~ k(k0)[1 Gk(q;k0)]
The same abuse of the law of large numbers gives Fk(q) = Pr(qj  qjj is type k), giving the xed
point problem, K functional equations for the K unknown functions fFk()gk2K:
Fk(q) = e
 
P
k02K ~ k(k0)

1 
R 1
0 Fk0

(
q
z)
1


dH(z)

(14)
4.1 A Parametric Assumption
We will use the same functional forms as in the one type model, H(z) = 1  

z
z0
 
and ~ k(k0) =
k(k0)z
 
0 . We will then look at the equilibrium of the limiting economy as z0 ! 0. With a similar
argument, we will show that any set of solutions to equation (14) must follow Frechet distributions.
As before we can write
~ k(k0)

1   Gk(q;k0)

= q k(k0)
Z

q
z0
 1

0
x 1 (1   Fk0(x))dx
37Substituting into equation (14) for each k0 we get
 logFk(q) = q  X
k02K
k(k0)
Z

q
z0
 1

0
x 1 (1   Fk0(x))dx
For any set of fFk()gk2K, as z0 ! 0, this expression goes to q  multiplied by a constant. For
each k, label this constant k so that Fk(q) = e kq 
.
We next solve for fkgk2K, which are dened to satisfy
k =
X
k02K
k(k0)
Z 1
0
x 1 (1   Fk0(x))dx =
X
k02K
k(k0)
Z 1
0
xF0
k0(x)dx
Plugging in the functional form for Fk0(q) gives
k =  (1   )
X
k02K
k(k0)
k0 (15)
Notice also that, as before, for any fk(k0)gk;k02K there are three solutions to equation (15): k =
0;8k 2 K, k = 1;8k 2 K, and a third solution that is the solution to the planner's problem.
4.2 Aggregate Output
Given the distribution of eciency across rms, total output will be Y 0 = QL where Q" 1 =
R
J q" 1
j (again, the analysis in the one type economy carries over). It will be convenient to dene
Qk 
 R 1
0 q" 1dFk(q)
 1
" 1 to be a productivity aggregator among rms of type k. We can then
write
Q" 1 =
X
k2K
MkQ" 1
k
38With the functional forms, we can write (as before):
Qk = 
1=
k  

1  
"   1

 1
" 1
The productivity aggregator for the whole economy can then be written as
Q" 1 =  

1  
"   1

 X
k2K
Mk
" 1

k
5 Superstars and Productivity Spillovers
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how changing the conguration of the network
aects aggregate output. We consider examples in which there are two types of rms, indexed by
k 2 fA;Bg. The total mass of rms is MA + MB = 1. Again, the types of rms dier only in how
frequently they are involved with new techniques that are discovered. For a rm of type k let k
be the (cumulative) arrival rate of techniques, so that k =
P
k0 k(k0).
To focus on the in
uence of the conguration, I will hold the total number of techniques in the
network constant but vary their distribution. In other words, I will let fk(k0)g and fMkg vary
subject to
 = MA (A(A) + A(B)) + MB (B(A) + B(B))
holding  constant.
The heterogeneity across types is parameterized as follows: Let s  A
B =
A(A)+A(B)
B(A)+B(B) (s is for
\supplier"). This is a measure of how much more frequently type A rms discover new techniques.
When s is larger, type A has a larger advantage in nding potential suppliers.
39Similarly, let b 
(A(A)+B(A))=MA
(A(B)+B(B))=MB (b is for buyer). This is a measure of how much more
frequently type A rms nd potential buyers. When b is larger, type A has a larger advantage
in nding potential buyers. If b = 1 then the probability of being a supplier is uniform across all
rms. If b > 1, then a new technique is relatively more likely to use a type A rm than would be
suggested by MA and MB.
Given the values of s and b (along with the assumption that
A(B)
A(A) =
B(B)
B(A) which can easily
be abandoned) we can solve for the implied values of fA(A);A(B);B(A);B(B)g:
A(A) =
bMA
bMA + MB
s
sMA + MB

A(B) =
MB
bMA + MB
s
sMA + MB

B(A) =
bMA
bMA + MB
1
sMA + MB

B(B) =
MA
bMA + MB
1
sMA + MB

To compute aggregate output, we need an expression for the productivity aggregator Q =
R
J q" 1
j
 1
" 1. Given the values of fk(k0)gk;k02K we can solve for the values of A and B using
equation (15). With this, we can then solve for the productivity aggregator Q:
Q" 1 = MAQ" 1
A + MBQ" 1
B / MA
" 1

A + MB
" 1

B
where QA and QB are the productivity aggregators among rms of each type. We are interested
in how Q varies as the structure of the network changes.
Specialization
We rst consider an environment in which rms specialize in activities. Type A rms have an
40advantage in nding new production techniques (s > 1) but type B rms have an advantage in
nding potential buyers (b < 1). One can think of type A rms as specializing in R&D and type
B rms as specializing in marketing.
Figure 5 shows aggregate output relative to a uniform network (s = b = 1) with the same
number of total techniques. It is evident that when rms specialize, Aggregate output is quite a
bit lower than a uniformly random network.
Because the R&D rms discover more techniques, they are more productive. However, the rms
specializing in marketing are acquiring a larger share of potential customers. The cost savings found
by the R&D rms get less of a chance to be passed on to other rms: the wrong rms are supplying
the inputs.
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Figure 5: Specialization: Varying s > 1, b < 1
Figure 5 shows aggregate output relative to a uniform network for various values of activity
(Figure 5a and Figure 5b show the same graph at dierent scales). When s is larger, type A
rms discover techniques more frequently. When b < 1, type B rms nd potential buyers
more frequently.
Hubs
We rst consider the case in which type A rms are hubs: they are more likely to discover new
techniques and they are relatively more likely to be the supplier when other rms get new techniques.
41This scenario is motivated by a partially urbanized economy in which urban entrepreneurs interact
with each other frequently, while rural entrepreneurs are less active. Formally we set s = b and
vary this common number for various values of MA. Figure 6 shows aggregate output relative to a
uniform network (s = b = 1) with the same number of techniques per rm. When the network is
close to uniform, aggregate output rises with the increased concentration of techniques among type
A rms. However this relationship is non-monotonic; as s;b ! 1, relative productivity slowly
falls back to 1.
Aggregate output is higher than in the uniform network because the more productive rms
are becoming the important suppliers in the economy. When s > 1, type A rms draw many
techniques and are therefore more likely to have high eciency. While type B rms draw a smaller
number of techniques, the techniques they do draw are likely to have type A rms as suppliers,
meaning that the type B rms are likely to end up with a low marginal cost. When b;s ! 1,
the impact disappears, because all type B rms are essentially disconnected from the network
and are no longer able to benet from the high eciency of the type A rms. Type A rms are
extremely productive (there are more techniques among them) but fewer rms are producing, and
consequently less gains from variety. These eects exactly oset, and aggregate output is the same
as the uniform case.
For intermediate values, the increase in aggregate output in response to concentration is larger
when MA is small. This happens because more techniques are concentrated within the type A
rms, so productivity among those rms is high. Type B rms are likely to have techniques that
use type A rms, so that they are increasingly able to benet from the high productivity among
type A that is due to the increased concentration. This is most stark as MA ! 0, in which case
the peak of the curve rises unboundedly. More formally, for a given MA, set b = s =
1=2
MA. Then
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Figure 6: Type A are Hubs: Varying Both s and b
Figure 6 shows aggregate output relative to a uniform network for various values of activity
(Figure 6a and Figure 6b show the same graph at dierent scales). When the common value of
p and s is larger, a larger share techniques involve type A rms.
limMA!0 Q = 1.26
Advantage in Finding Potential Suppliers
We next examine the case in which s varies but b = 1, shown in Figure 7. In this case
type A rms are more likely to discover new techniques, but do not have any advantage in nding
potential buyers. Here we can see that total output is smaller than the uniform case (and the drop
is persistent: as s ! 1, relative productivity stays depressed below 1). Here, while type A rms
are more productive as a group than they would be in the uniform case, the type B rms are less
able to take advantage of this, because the techniques they nd aren't especially concentrated on
the type A rms. As a result, type B rms are less productive in than they would be in the uniform
case, so much so that this dominates the increased productivity among type A rms.
The intuition for why aggregate productivity is lower than the uniform case can be found in
26An even more stark example (which is easier to analyze by hand) is s =
MB
MA and b ! 1. This leads to
(normalizing  = 1), A(A) =
1=2
MA, B(A) =
1=2
MB , A(B) = B(B) = 0. Here, no matter how few type A rms there
are, half of all total techniques are drawn by those rms. However, all techniques use type A rms as inputs. Again,
we have limMA!0 Q = 1.
43equation (15) relating the average eciencies of each type: k =  (1   )
P
k02K k(k0)
k0. Note
that k is a linear combination of concave functions of each of the k0s. Thus k would be higher if
the k0s were closer together.
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Figure 7: Type A discover techniques more frequently: Varying s with b = 1
Figure 7 shows aggregate output relative to a uniform network for various values of activity
(Figure 7a and Figure 7b show the same graph at dierent scales). When s is larger, type A
rms discover techniques more frequently.
Advantage in Finding Potential Buyers
Lastly we examine the the case in which s = 1 but b varies, so that A has an advantage in
nding potential buyers, but not in nding potential suppliers. As shown in Figure 8, aggregate
productivity is exactly the same as in the uniform case. Considering this and the previous case, we
can infer the dierent roles of b and s. s generates productivity dierences across the dierent
types, as drawing more techniques leads to (on average) higher productivity. b determines how
much of these productivity dierences spill over to the other types. In this case where s = 1, there
are no productivity dierences to spill over, so varying b makes no dierences. Compare this to
s 6= 1, in which case varying b can make a big dierence.
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Figure 8: Type A discover potential buyers more frequently: s = 1, Varying b
Figure 8 shows aggregate output relative to a uniform network for various values of activity.
When b is larger, type A rms are more likely to nd potential buyers. This is not a misprint;
all three lines take the constant value 1.
6 Multiple Inputs
In the preceding analysis, each rm used a single input in production. While this is assumption
makes the analysis (and visualization) of the model economy considerably easier, it is obviously at
odds with production in the real world. In this section we extend the analysis so that rms use
multiple inputs. While there are several ways to model what happens when rms discover new
production methods, I will focus on a version that I consider to be both natural and tractable.
A rm needs to accomplish a xed set of tasks. Over time, rms discover new techniques to
accomplishing each task, and each of these techniques is a sub-production function that requires a
particular input. In this way, a rm can improve production by nding techniques that are more
cost eective in accomplishing individual tasks.27
The central assumption is that each rm uses a production function that combines N tasks into
a unit of output. To accomplish each task, the rm uses a technique. For the technique used for
27An alternative modeling strategy is that a new technique requires an entirely new input bundle. In that model,
a rm would change suppliers all at once, rather than one at a time.
45the nth task, let zn be the cost of inputs and qn be the eciency of the supplier associated with
that task. Then the production is such that the eciency of the rm is
q =
N Y
n=1
(znq
n)
1
N
The production function that justies this can be written in two ways that are equivalent as long
as the rm minimizes cost:
y =
N Y
n=1
 
znx
nL1 
n  1 
N
1    
N

! 1
N
y =
1
(1   )
1 
N Y
n=1
 
N
  
N
N Y
n=1
z
1
N
n
 
N Y
n=1
x
1
N
n
!
L1 
The dierence between the two is that in the rst version labor is explicitly allocated separately to
each task. The important feature is that  is the share of intermediate inputs.
Let F(q) be the fraction of rms with eciency no greater than q. We will use the same method
as before to solve to dene a xed point problem for F.
For a rm, let vn be the eciency of a rm in accomplishing the nth task. Also, the number
of techniques a rm has to accomplish a given task is follows a Poisson distribution with mean
~  (which is the same for each task). Let K(v) be probability that vn < v.28 Then by the same
analysis as before, we can write
K(v) = e
 ~ 
R 1
0
h
1 F

(
v
z)
1=i
dH(z)
28The analysis can easily be extended so that ~  varied by task, which would imply that the CDFs of each vn to be
dierent (i.e. Kn()).
46Since q =
QN
n=1 v
1
N
n , we can write F(q) as
F(q) =
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
K
 
qN
QN
n=2 vn
!
dK (v2)dK (v3):::dK (vN)
We now impose the parametric assumptions H(z) = 1   (z=z0)
  and ~  = z
 
0 . As shown in
Appendix F, in the limiting economy as z0 ! 0, the fraction of tasks with techniques delivering
eciency no greater than v converges to a Frechet distribution
K(v) = e v 
 =  

1  

N
N
The expression for F is messier, but we can derive an expression for aggregate productivity Q =
 R 1
0 q" 1dF(q)
 1
" 1:
Q =  

1  
("   1)=
N
 N
" 1

1
(1 ) 

1  

N
N 1
(1 )
This generalizes the formula for aggregate productivity with a single input given by equa-
tion (12).Since  
 
1   
N
N and  

1  
(" 1)=
N
 N
" 1 are decreasing in N, aggregate productivity is
declining in the number of inputs, as shown in Figure 9.
Aggregate productivity declines with the number of inputs as a consequence because the tail of
superstar suppliers shrinks. This happens because of two mutually reinforcing mechanisms. First,
the distribution of eciency F(q) becomes more concentrated. With a single input, a rm would
end up with a high eciency with one great technique. With more inputs, a rm that gets lucky
enough to draw a great technique for one of its tasks may only have low eciency techniques for its
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Figure 9: Aggregate Productivity by Number of Inputs
Figure 9 shows aggregate productivity Q the as the number of inputs changes. The parameters
are  = 1=2,  = 4, and  = 4, with  set so that the limiting aggregate productivity when the
number of inputs grows large is 1. The purple line is the asymptotic aggregate productivity as
the number of inputs grows large.
other tasks. The more inputs there are, the harder it is for a rm to have a high overall eciency,
as the the law of large numbers (across tasks) begins to kick in.
On top of this, when eciencies are more concentrated among potential suppliers, it becomes
harder to draw a high eciency technique for a single task. The eciency provided by a technique
is zq, and less dispersion in q implies that relatively high eciency techniques are drawn less
frequently.
A stark feature of the model that drives this result is that all tasks enter symmetrically into
production. If instead production were dominated by relatively few core tasks, then the distribution
of eciencies would be less concentrated and superstar suppliers would be more relevant.
Alternatively, if tasks are substitutes then the high eciency tasks will have a large cost share.
In the limit as the elasticity of substitution goes to innity, the N input model would converge to
48the single input model.
7 Conclusion
This paper has described a tractable model of the formation and evolution of chains of production.
The model aggregates easily, with a simple formula connecting features of the network to aggregate
output. A key feature driving aggregate productivity is whether the low cost producers are able
to become the important suppliers of the economy. To become an important supplier, a rm must
have many potential customers who know how to use the rm's good and to be able to charge
those potential customers a low price. When intermediate goods are more important in production
(relative to labor), the ability to charge a low price becomes more important in winning customers,
and the lowest cost rms are more likely to become superstar suppliers. This increases aggregate
productivity and also increases the market concentration in sales of intermediate goods.
With more interesting network congurations, the model can be solved almost as easily. With
multiple types, aggregate productivity depends on how productivity and demand covary across
groups. Holding the total quantity of techniques xed, concentration of link formation among a
subset of rms, e.g., in a city, leads to positive correlation and higher aggregate output. In contrast,
negative correlation, e.g., if some rms specialize in R&D whereas others specialize in marketing,
can lead to signicantly lower output.
49Appendix
A Notation
A chain of techniques is a sequence of techniques (nite of innite) 012::: with the s(k+1) =
b(k). Given the set of all existing techniques, , we can dene several objects.
Let C(j) be the set of chains of techniques with the property 012::: with the additional
property that b(0) = j. These are the distinct supply chains available that could be used to
produce good j. For example, if rm j1 has access to a single technique 1 with supplier j2, and
j2 has access to two techniques 2 and 3, then C contains the three distinct chains 1, 12, and
13.
Let CN(j)  C(j) be the set of chains of techniques to produce good j with exactly N tech-
niques. Let bN(j)  jCN(j)j be the number of such distinct supply chains of length N.
Lastly, let C1(j)  C(j) be the set of innite chains of techniques to produce good j. These
are all of the viable supply chains to produce good j. C1
N (j) is the set of chains of techniques of
length N that form the beginning of an innite supply chains. For example, 012::: 2 C1(j),
then 01 is in C1
2 (j).
B The Number of Supply Chains
For completeness, we show the derivation of two results from the theory of branching processes
that will be used in this paper (see for example Athreya and Ney (1972)).
Let p(k) be the probability that a rm has exactly k techniques, in this case equal to e ~ ~ k
k! ,
and PN(l;k) be the probability that, in total, l dierent rms have among them k supply chains
of length N. Note that PN(1;k) is the probability a rm has exactly k supply chains of length N
(i.e., the probability that bN = k).
Dene '(x) =
P1
k=0 p(k)xk to be the probability generating function for the random variable
b1. In this case '(x) = e ~ (1 x). Also, for each N, let 'N() be the probability generating function
associated with bN. If '(N) is the N-fold composition of ' then we have the convenient result:
Claim 1 'N(x) = '(N)(x)
Proof. We proceed by induction. By denition, the statement is true for N = 1. Noting that P1
k=0 P1(l;k)xk = '(x)l, we have
'N+1(x) =
1 X
l=0
PN+1(1;l)xl =
1 X
l=0
1 X
k=0
PN(1;k)P1(k;l)xl =
1 X
k=0
PN(1;k)
1 X
l=0
P1(k;l)xl
=
1 X
k=0
PN(1;k)'(x)k = 'N('(x))
We immediately have the following:
Claim 2 For any x, E

xbN
= '(N)(x):
50Proof. E

xbN
=
P1
k=0 PN(1;k)xk = 'N(x) = '(N)(x)
We next study the probability that a single rm has no chains that continue indenitely. This
can be characterized as follows:
Claim 3 The probability that a single rm has no chains that continue indenitely is the smallest
root, , of y = '(y).
Proof. The probability that a rm has no chains greater than length N is given by PN(1;0), or
equivalently '(N)(0): Then the probability that a single rm has no chains that continue indenitely
is limN!1 'N(0).
Next note that that ' is increasing and convex, '(1) = 1, and '(0)  0. This implies that in
the range [0;1], the equation '(y) = y has a either a unique root at y = 1 or two roots, y = 1 and
a second in (0;1).
Let  be the smallest root. Noting that for y 2 [0;), y < '(y) < , while for y 2 (;1) (if such
y exist),  < '(y) < y. Together these imply that if y 2 [0;1), the sequence f'N(y)g is monotone
and bounded, and therefore has a limit. We have 'N+1(0) = '('N(0)). Taking limits of both
sides (and noting that ' is continuous) gives limN!1 'N+1(0) = '(limN!1 'N(0)). Therefore
the limit must be a root of y = '(y), and therefore must be . In other words, it must be that
limN!1 'N(0) = .
Claim 4 If ~   1 then with probability 1 the rm has no chains that continue indenitely. If ~  > 1
then there is a strictly positive probability the rm has a chain that continues indenitely.
Proof. In this case, we have '(x) = e ~ (1 x). If ~   1 then the smallest root of y = '(y) is y = 1.
If ~  > 1 the smallest root is strictly less than 1.
C Existence and Characterization of the Solution to the Planner's
Problem
The strategy is as follows: We dene a sequence of random variables fXNgN2N with the property
that the maximum feasible eciency of a rm is given by the limit of this sequence, if such a limit
exists. We then show that XN converges to a random variable Xsp in L" 1. Next we show that the
distribution of Xsp is given by the unique xed point of T in F, a subset of  F (and of course that
such a xed point exists). Letting Fsp be this least xed point, we apply the law of large numbers
for continuum of random variables (Uhlig (1996)) to argue that the cross-sectional distribution of
eciencies (in L" 1) is given by Fsp and that aggregate productivity is simply kXspk" 1.
C.1 A Unique Fixed Point
We begin by dening three functions,  f, f1, and f, in  F. To do so, we dene several objects
that will parameterize these functions. Let  2 (0;1) be the smallest root of  = e ~ (1 ). In
the denition of  f, q2 and  are dened as follows: Let  > "   1, let q2 be dened so that
q1 
2 > max
n
1; ~ 

 exp
R 1
z0 log(z)dH(z)
o
. In the denition of f, q0 = z
1
1 
0 . The three functions
51are:
 f(q) 
(
; q < q2
1   (1   )

q
q2

; q  q2
f1(q) 

; q < 1
1; q  1
f(q) 

; q < q0
1; q  q0
Consider the partial order on  F, the set of right continuous, weakly increasing functions f :
R+ ! [0;1] given by the binary relation : f1  f2 , f1(q)  f2(q)8q  0. Clearly  f  f1  f.
Let F   F be the subset of set of nondecreasing functions f : R+ ! [0;1] that satisfy  f  f  f.
Lemma 1 Tf  f and  f  T  f
Proof. We rst show that Tf  f. For q  q0 this is immediate, as Tf(q)  1 = f(q). For q < q0,
we have
Tf(q) = e
 ~ 
R 1
0

1 f

(
q
z)
1


dH(z)
= e
 ~ 
R 1
q=q
0
[1 ]dH(z)
 e ~ [1 ](1 H(q1 
0 )) =  = f(q)
We now proceed to  f. First, for q < q2, we have T  f(q) = e ~ 
R 1
0 (1   f)dH(z)  e ~ (1 ) =  = f(q).
Next, as an intermediate step, we will show that for q  q2:

q
q2
 
> ~ 
"
exp
Z q=q
2
0
ln

z



dH (z)   ln

(q=q
2)



H (q=q
2)
#
We start with q1 
2 > ~ 

 exp
R 1
0 ln(z)dH (z) which can be written as
q1 
2 > ~ 

 exp
"Z q=q
2
0
ln(z)dH (z) +
Z 1
q=q
2
ln(z)dH(z)
#
Using the fact that q  q2 and that
R 1
x ln(z)dH(z)  ln(x)[1   H(x)] gives
q1  > ~ 


"
exp
Z q=q
2
0
ln(z)dH (z) + ln(q=q
2)[1   H (q=q
2)]
#
Raising both sides to

 and dividing (q=q
2)

 gives the desired result.
52Next, beginning with 1   T  f(q)   lnT  f(q)
1   T  f (q)
1   
 ~ 
Z 1
0
1    f

(q=z)
1


1   
dH (z)
 ~ exp
Z 1
0
ln
2
4
1    f

(q=z)
1


1   
3
5dH (z)
= ~ exp
Z q=q
2
0
ln
 
(q=z)
1

q2
! 
dH (z)
= ~ exp
"Z q=q
2
0
ln

z



dH (z)   ln

(q=q
2)



H (q=q
2)
#
<

q
q2
 
=
1    f (q)
1   
This then gives, for q  q2, T  f(q)   f(q).
Lemma 2 There exist least and greatest xed points of the operator T in F, given by limN!1 TN  f
and limN!1 TNf respectively.
Proof. Proof: The operator T is order preserving, and the F is a complete lattice. By the Tarski
xed point theorem, the set of xed pints of T in F is also a complete lattice, and hence has a least
and a greatest xed point given by limTN  f and limTNf respectively.
C.2 Existence of a Limit
We rst show that the planer's problem is well dened. Given the set of techniques at a point in
time, , let C1
j be the set of distinct innite chains available to produce good j. For each chain
c 2 C1
j and each n  0, let zn(c) is the productivity of the nth technique in chain c. In other
words, for a chain c of techniques 012::: with 0 furthest downstream, zn(c) = z(n). Finally
let q(c) 
Q1
n=0 zn(c)n
.
We want to dene qj to be the eciency provided by the most cost eective supply chain
available to produce j, or more formally that qj = supc2C1
j q(c). To do this, we rst argue that
for each c, q(c) is well dened. The concern is that for some c the sequence
nQN
n=0 zn(c)no
might
not converge. The following proposition shows that it does.
Dene qN(c) 
QN 1
n=0 zn(c)n
for N  1 with q0(c)  1.
Lemma 3 Assume z0 > 0. Then for each c 2 C1
j , limN!1 qN(c) exists.
Proof. For each n, we can decompose logzn(c) into logz+
n (c)   logz 
n (c), where logz+
n (c) =
maxflogzn(c);0g and logz 
n (c) = maxf logzn(c);0g. We then have logqN(c) =
PN 1
n=0 n logz+
n (c) 
53PN 1
n=0 n logz 
n (c).
PN 1
n=0 n logz+
n (c) is a monotone sequence so it converges to a (possibly in-
nite) limit.
PN 1
n=0 n logz 
n (c) is a monotone sequence bounded by
log(1=z0)
1  so it converges to a
limit in the range
h
0;
log(1=z0)
1 
i
. Therefore qN(c) converges to a (possibly innite) limit.
Next, we dene the random variable XN;j = maxc2C1
j qN(c). Roughly, the remainder of this
subsection shows that XN;j converges qj. Since qj = supc2C1
j limN!1 qN(c), we are essentially
proving that the limit can be passed through the sup.
A useful property of the variable XN;j is that its CDF is TNf1. It will also be useful to dene
the random variables  YN;j and YN;j. These variables will be constructed so that their CDFs are
TN  f, and TNf respectively.
To do this, we expand the probability space as follows: For each realization of , let ~ q(c) be a
random variable with CDF
 f 
1  drawn independently for each c 2 C1
N;j.
For N  1, let  YN;j  maxc2C1
N;j qN(c)~ q(c)N
and YN;j  maxc2C1
N;j qN(c)qN
0 . We also dene
 Y0;j and Y0;j to have CDFs  f and f respectively.
To improve readability, the subscript j will be suppressed when not necessary.
Lemma 4 fXNgN2N,
 YN
	
N2N, and fYNgN2N are uniformly integrable in L" 1.
Proof. First, Recall that  Y0 is dened to have the cumulative distribution  f. Since the T is
order preserving, the relations TNf1  TN  f and TN  f  TN 1  f imply that TNf1   f. As
a consequence,  Y0 rst-order stochastically dominates each XN and  YN, and, by the identical
argument, YN. Therefore E

 Y0

" 1 =
q" 1
2
1  " 1

< 1 serves as a uniform bound on each EjXNj
" 1,
E
  YN
 " 1, and EjYNj
" 1.
Lemma 5 There exists a random variable Xsp such that XN converges to Xsp almost surely and
in L" 1.
Proof. Let MN  XN QN
n=0 n where n 
R 1
z0 wn ~ (1 )H0(w)e ~ (1 )[1 H(w)]
1 e ~ (1 ) dw. We rst show that
MN is a submartingale that is uniformly integrable in L" 1.
To do this, we dene a set DN as follows: Let c
N = argmaxc2C1
N qN(c) so that XN = qN (c
N).
Let DN  C1
N be the set of chains in C1
N for which the rst N  1 links are c
N 1. In other words,
all chains in DN are of the form c
N 1 for some .
Dene the random variable DN = maxc2DN qN(c). Since DN  C1
N , it must be that XN  DN.
We now show that E [DNjCN 1]  N 1XN:
The number of chains in DN is at least one. The probability that jDNj = k is
e ~ [1 ][~ (1 )]
k
[1 e ~ [1 ]]k!
for k  1. To see this, note that for any node, the number of techniques is poisson with mean ~ .
Each of those has probability 1    of being viable (having a chain that continues innitely), and
we are conditioning on at least one viable technique.
Each of those techniques has a productivity drawn from H. For any  such that c
N 1 2 DN,
we have that
Pr
 
qN (c
N) < xjC1
N 1

= Pr
 
z()n
< x=XN 1

= H

(x=XN 1)
 N
54Therefore the probability that all k of the chains in DN give qN (c
N) < x given XN 1 is
Pr
 
DN < xjC1
N 1;jDNj = k

= H

(x=XN 1)
 Nk
With this, the CDF of DN, given C1
N1, is
Pr
 
DN < xjC1
N 1

=
1 X
k=1
Pr(DN < xjXN 1;jDNj = k)Pr(jDNj = k)
=
1 X
k=1
H

(x=XN 1)
 Nk e ~ [1 ]
h
~ (1   )
ik
h
1   e ~ [1 ]
i
k!
=
e
~ [1 ]H

(x=XN 1) N

  1
e
~ [1 ]   1
We can now compute the conditional expectation of DN (using the change of variables w =
(x=XN 1)
 N
):
E

DNjC1
N 1

=
Z 1
0
x N 1
XN 1

x
XN 1
 N 1
~ (1   )H0

(x=XN 1)
 N e
~ [1 ]H

(x=XN 1) N

e
~ [1 ]   1
dx
= XN 1
Z 1
0
wN~ (1   )H0 (w)
e
~ [1 ]H(w)
e
~ [1 ]   1
dw
= NXN 1
Putting this together, we have
E

MNjC1
N 1

=
1
QN
n=0 n
E

XNjC1
N 1


1
QN
n=0 n
E

DNjC1
N 1

=
1
QN
n=0 n
NXN 1 = MN 1
We next need to show that fMNg is uniformly integrable, i.e., that supN E[MN] < 1. We
know that supN E[XN] < 1. So it suces to show a uniform lower bound on
QN
n=0 n. Since each
n  zn
0 and z0 < 1, we have that
QN
n=0 n 
QN
n=0 zn
0 
Q1
n=0 zn
0 = z
1
1 
0 .
We have therefore established that fMNgN2N is a uniformly integrable (in L1) submartingale,
so by the martingale convergence theorem, there exists an M such that MN converges to M almost
surely. By the continuous mapping theorem, there exists an Xsp such that XN converges to Xsp
almost surely. Since each X" 1
N is dominated by the integrable random variable  Y " 1
0 , by dominated
convergence we have that XN converges to Xsp in L" 1.
Proposition 5 With probability one, Xsp = supc2C1 q(c)
Proof. We rst show that Xsp  supc2C1 q(c) with probability one. Consider any realization of
techniques, . For any  > 0, there exists a c 2 C1 such that q(c) > supc2C1 q(c)   . There
also exists an N1 such that N > N1 implies qN(c) > q(c)   . Lastly, with probability one there
55exists an N2 such that N > N2 implies XN < Xsp + . We then have for N > maxN1;N2 that
Xsp > XN    = max
c2C1
N
qN(c)     qN(c)    > q(c)   2 > sup
c2C1
q(c)   3; w:p:1
This is true for any  > 0, so Xsp  supc2C1 q(c). We next show the opposite inequality. For any
N, we have
sup
c2C1
q(c)  sup
c2C1
qN(c)z
N
1 
0 = XNz
N
1 
0
Since this is true for any N and limN!1 z
N
1 
0 = 1, we can take the limit to get supc2C1 q(c)  Xsp
with probability one.
C.3 Characterization of the Limit
We will show below that log  YN   logYN converges to 0 in probability. Since XN 2 [YN;  YN], it
must be that both  YN and YN converge to Xsp in probability. Convergence in probability implies
convergence in distribution, which gives to implications. First, TN  f and TNf converge to the
same limiting function. Since these are the least and greatest xed points of T in F, this limiting
function, fsp, is the unique xed point of T in F. Second, since TN  f  TNf1  TNf, fsp is the
CDF of Xsp.
Lemma 6 For any  > 1, limN!1 1   '(N)
 
 f

 N
q0

 
1 
!
= 0
Proof. We rst show that for x 2 [0;1], d
dx'(N)(x)  ~ N. To see this, note that ' is convex and
'0(1) = ~ , so that '0(x)  ~  for x  1. In addition, if x 2 [0;1] then '(x) 2 (0;1], which implies
'(N)(x) 2 (0;1] for each N. We then have
d
dx
'(N)(x) =
N Y
n=1
'0

'(n 1)(x)

 ~ N
With this, for any x, we can bound '(N)(x) by
'(N)(x) = '(N)(1)  
Z 1
x
'(N)0(w)dw
 1   ~ N
Z 1
x
dw
 1   ~ N [1   x]
56To complete the proof, we show that limN!1 ~ N
"
1  
 f

 N
q0

 
1 
#
= 0. Recall that
 f(q) 
1 rho =
(
0 q < q2
1  

q
q2
 
q  q2
. We have for q  q2
lim
N!1
~ N
2
41  
 f

 N
q0

  
1   
3
5 = lim
N!1
~ Nq

2

  N
= 0
Next we use this to show that log  YN   logYN converges to zero in probability.
Lemma 7 For any  > 1, limN!1 Pr
  YN=YN > 

= 0.
Proof. For any chain c 2 CN, dene the following two objects:  qN(c)  qN(c)~ q(c)N
(recall that
for each c 2 C1
N ~ q(c) was a random variable with CDF
 f 
1 ) and qN(c)  qN(c)qN
0 (q0 is the same
as a random variable with CDF
f 
1 ). With these denitions, we have  YN;j  maxc2C1
N;j  qN(c) and
YN;j  maxc2C1
N;j qN(c).
Conditional on the set of techniques , we have that for each chain c in C1
N (if any exist) that
 qN(c)=qN(c) =

~ q(c)
q0
N
. We therefore have:
Pr
 
 qN(c)=qN(c) < j

= Pr
 
~ q(c)
q0
N
< j
!
=
 f

 N
q0

  
1   
If there are bN such chains of length N, the probability that every one of them of them gives
 qN(c)=qN(c) <  is
 
 f

 N
q0

 
1 
!bN
so that
Pr
  YN=YN < j


0
@
 f

 N
q0

  
1   
1
A
bN
Recall from Appendix B that for any x, E

xbN
= '(N)(x) where '(N) is the N-fold composition
of ' and the expectations are taken over realizations of . We can use this to show
Pr
  YN=YN < 

= E

Pr
  YN=YN < j

 E
2
6
4
0
@
 f

 N
q0

  
1   
1
A
bN3
7
5 = '(N)
0
@
 f

 N
q0

  
1   
1
A
57Put dierently, limN!1 Pr
  YN=YN > 

 limN!1 1   '(N)
 
 f

 N
q0

 
1 
!
. We complete the
proof by applying the previous lemma.
We now come to the main result.
Proposition 6 There is a unique xed point of T on F, Fsp. Fsp is CDF of Xsp. Aggregate
productivity is Q =
 R 1
0 q" 1dFsp(q)
 1
" 1 with probability one.
Proof. The combination of log  YN   logYN
p
! 0,  YN  XN  YN, and XN
p
! Xsp implies that
 YN
p
! Xsp and YN
p
! Xsp.
We rst show that there is a unique xed point, which is also the CDF of Xsp. The CDFs
of  YN and YN are TN  f and TNf respectively. The least and greatest xed points of T in F are
limN!1 TN  f and limN!1 TNf respectively. Convergence in probability implies convergence in
distribution, so the least and greatest xed point are the same, and that the xed point is the CDF
of Xsp. Call this xed point Fsp.
Since
 YN
	
and fYNg are uniformly integrable in L" 1, we have by Vitali's convergence theorem
that  Y N ! Xsp in L" 1 and Y N ! Xsp in L" 1.
Putting all of these pieces together, we have that the CDF of qj is Fsp. We next show that
aggregate productivity is the Q =
 R 1
0 q" 1dfsp(q)
 1
" 1. For this we simply apply the law of large
numbers for a continuum economy of Uhlig (1996). To do this, we must verify that the eciencies
are pairwise uncorrelated. This is trivial: consider two rms, j and i. Since the number of rms in
any of j's supply chains is countable, the probability that i and j have overlapping supply chains is
zero. The theorem in Uhlig (1996) also requires that the variable in question has a nite variance,
and if it does, the then the L2 integral exists. Here we are interested in the L" 1 norm, so we require
the Xsp is L" 1 integrable. Therefore we have that Q =
 R 1
0 q" 1dfsp(q)
 1
" 1 with probability one.
D Size Distribution
D.1 Number of Customers
Proposition 7 Let pn be the mass of rms with n customers. Then
pn =
Z 1
0

w 
 (1 )
n
e
 

w 
 (1 )

n!
e wdw
The counter cumulative distribution has a tail index of 1=.
58Proof.
pn =
Z 1
0
 
qn
e  
 q
n!
dF (q)
=
Z 1
0



 
q  n
e
 


 (q )
 
n!
q  1e q 
dq
=
Z 1
0

w 
 (1 )
n
e
 

w 
 (1 )

n!
e wdw
The second line uses the fact that  =  (1   ). We can rewrite this as
pn =
Z 1
0
une n
n!
e [ (1 )u] 1=
 (1   )
1

u  1
 1du
Since e [ (1 )u] 1=
 (1 )
1
 
is slowly varying as u ! 1, applying Theorem 2.1 of Willmot (1990) gives
pn 
e [ (1 )n] 1=
 (1   )
1

n  1
 1; n ! 1
Therefore the counter-cumulative distribution, Pr(# customers > n), has a tail index of 1=.
D.2 The Distribution of Employment
Let (s) be the characteristic function associated with the cross sectional distribution of employ-
ment. This is the central object of interest, but to get at it, we take several intermediate steps. If
L0(q) is the (deterministic) quantity of labor used producing nal output for a rm with eciency
q, let 0(sjq) be the characteristic function for labor used for nal demand. We have
0(sjq) =
Z 1
 1
eisl
 
l   L0(q)

dl = eisL0(q)
Z 1
 1
eisx(x)dx
= eisL0(q)
where  is the Dirac delta function.
We showed above that the quantity of labor used by a single customer can be treated as an IID
random variable. Recall also the convenient fact that if rm j uses Lj units of labor, j's supplier
will use Lj units of labor to make the inputs for j. If Lj is an IID random variable, Lj is as
well. With this in mind, let 1(s) be the characteristic function associated with the labor required
to make the inputs for a single customer. If the density of labor is Pr(Lj = l), the density of labor
used for a supplier is 1
 Pr
 
Lj = 1


, so that we have
591(s) =
Z 1
 1
1

Pr

Lj =
l


e isldl =
Z 1
 1
Pr

Lj =
l


e i(s) l
d

l


= (s)
Let int (sjq) be the characteristic function associated with the labor used for all intermediates
among rms with eciency q. Using the fact that the characteristic function of the sum of in-
dependent random variables is the product of the characteristic functions of each of the random
variables, we can write int (sjq) as
int (sjq) =
1 X
n=0
1(s)n Pr(n customersjq) =
1 X
n=0
1(s)n
 
qn
e 
q

n!
= e  
 q[1 1(s)]
= e  
 q[1 (s)]
where the second equality uses the fact that among rms with eciency q the distribution of
customers is Poisson with parameter 
q.
We can put these together to derive an expression for (sjq), the characteristic function asso-
ciated with the distribution of employment among rms with eciency q:
(sjq) = 0 (sjq)int (sjq) = eisL0(q)e  
 q[1 (s)]
Lastly we can integrate across rms, which delivers a single recursive equation that denes (s):
(s) =
Z 1
0
(sjq)dF (q) =
Z 1
0
eisL0(q)e  
 q[1 (s)]dF (q)
We now plug in the functional forms L0(q) = (q )
  " 1

 

1  " 1

 (1   )L and dF (q) = q  1e q 
dq
to give
(s) =
Z 1
0
e
is
0
B
@(q )
  " 1

 (1  " 1
 )
(1 )L
1
C
A
e 
(q )
 
 [1 (s)]q  1e q 
dq
and using a change of variables along with the fact that  =  (1   ) gives
(s) =
Z 1
0
exp
8
<
:
is
t
  " 1

 

1   " 1

 (1   )L  
t 
 (1   )
[1   (s)]   t
9
=
;
dt (16)
E Pairwise Stable Equilibria
We are careful here to use notation that allows for the possibility that a rm uses a production
chain with a cycle: at least some of the input from j is used in as an intermediate good in the
supply chain used by j. In this case, if a rm decides to lower its price of nal output, it sells more
60nal output but also raises the demand for its good as an intermediate input.
In particular, given an arrangement, for each  2 B
j , let xb()

y0
j

be the quantity of good
j sold to rm b() given y0
j, holding constant the nal output of other rms. xb()

y0
j

is an
nondecreasing and weakly concave function of y0
j. The prot for rm j can be written as:
j = max
p0
j;y0
j;L;x
p0
jy0
j +
X
2B
j

p()xb()
 
y0
j

+ ()

  wL   p()x    ()
subject to
y0
j +
X
2B
j
xb()
 
y0
j


1
(1   )1 z ()xL1 
y0
j  D
 
p0
j

The rst order conditions with respect to inputs deliver cost minimization, so that rm j's marginal
cost is cj  1
z()p()
 w1 . The price of nal output p0
j then satises:
p0
j = argmax
p
(p   cj)D(p) +
X
2B
j
(p()   cj)xb() (D(p))
Note that if good j is in the supply chain to produce good j (there is a cycle), rm j internalizes
how changing nal output would aect there sales of j as an intermediate.
Proposition 8 In any pairwise stable equilibrium, for each technique  that is used, p() = cs().
Proof. Assume there is a  = fj;i;zg such that x() > 0 and p() 6= ci. Consider the deviation
^ p() = ci
^  () =  () + xj (p()   ci) + K
where K 2

0;

^ p0
j   ^ cj

^ y0
j  

p0
j   ^ cj

y0
j +
P
2B
j (p()   ^ cj)
h
xb()

^ y0
j

  xb()

y0
j
i
. Given
i's cost ci, the cost for j of the new technique is ^ cj = 1
z()c
i w1 . The change in prot for i from
the deviation is
^ i   i = ^  ()    () + (^ p()   ci) ^ xj   (p()   ci)xj = K > 0
The change in prot for j from the deviation is
^ j   j =  [^  ()    ()] + ^ p0
j^ y0
j   p0
jy0
j +
X
2B
j
p()

xb()
 
^ y0
j

  xb()
 
y0
j

 
nh
w^ Lj + ci^ xj
i
  [wLj + p()xj]
o
61substituting in the expressions for ^ , ^ p, and ^ c, we have
^ j   j =
 
^ p0
j   ^ cj

^ y0
j  
 
p0
j   ^ cj

y0
j +
X
2B
j
(p()   ^ cj)

xb()
 
^ y0
j

  xb()
 
y0
j

  K
+

(1   ) +
ci
p()


p()
ci

  1

^ cj
0
B
@y0
j +
X
2B
j
xb()
 
y0
j

1
C
A
We know that [(1   ) + x]x   1 for  2 [0;1] (since xt is a convex function of t we
can use Jensen's inequality to get (1   )x  + x1   x(1 )( )+(1 ) = 1). Therefore 
(1   ) + ci
p()

p()
ci

 1, so that
^ j   j 
 
^ p0
j   ^ cj

^ y0
j  
 
p0
j   ^ cj

y0
j +
X
2B
j
(p()   ^ cj)

xb()
 
^ y0
j

  xb()
 
y0
j

  K > 0
Therefore the deviation is mutually benecial.
Proposition 9 In any pairwise stable equilibrium, for each technique  that is used,  ()  0.
Proof. If  () < 0, for some  = fj;i;zg then consider the unilateral deviation ^ A() = 0 (the
supplier i refuses the contract).
After the deviation, every rm's input price remains the same except j. j's price will change
and will use a technique from an alternative supplier (the next one on his list if there is one)
and hence an alternative supply chain. The quantity produced by i will change: it will no longer
produce inputs for j, and if the i is in j's alternative supply chain, i may produce more for that
chain. However, since price equals marginal cost, this change in quantity produced has no eect
on i's prot. We therefore have
^ i = i    () > i
which conrms the unilateral deviation.
Proposition 10 In any pairwise stable equilibrium, qj = max2S
j
n
z()q
s()
o
.
Proof. Assume that 
j = 1 

j;i1;z1	
and let cj = z1q
i1. Toward a contradiction, assume
there exists a 2 =

j;i2;z2	
2 S
j and that cj > ^ cj  z2q
i2.
Consider the pairwise deviation: ^ Oj
 
2
= 1, ^ Oj
 
1
> 1, ^ Ai2
 
2
= 1, ^ p
 
2
= ci2, and
^ 
 
2
=
maxp(p ^ cj)D(p) maxp(p cj)D(p)
2 > 0.
In the deviation, j0s marginal cost falls, but every other rm's marginal cost is unchanged.
Therefore j lowers its price of nal output, but no other rm does, so the quantity of nal output
of j rises.
Firm j nds the deviation protable, ^ j > j, because marginal cost has fallen: (i) j now makes
a positive prot on each unit of output sold as intermediate output (if j is in a cycle, then prot
from intermediates would rise even more); (ii) The change in prot from nal sales is greater than
the fee ^ 
 
2
; and (iii) j no longer as to pay 
 
1
(which is nonnegative).
62Firm i2 also nds the deviation protable, ^ i2 > i2, because it now collects ^ 
 
2
. Since price
equals marginal cost, changes in quantity produced as intermediates have no impact on its prot.
This conrms the unilateral deviation.
We now show that if there if each rm has access to a technology to produce its good using only
labor, yj = qL with common productivity q, then in every pairwise stable equilibrium aggregate
productivity Q is the same as in the planner's problem.
If q
pw
j is the eciency of rm j in a pairwise stable equilibrium, let Fpw = Pr

q
pw
j < q

be the
cross sectional CDF of eciencies in such an equilibrium. We can compare this to the distribution
of eciencies that solve the planner's problem, Fsp.
Proposition 11 In any pairwise stable equilibrium, Fpw = Fsp and Qpw = Qsp.
Proof. In both the planner's problem and in any pairwise stable equilibrium, each rm chooses
the technique that delivers the most cost eective combination:
qj = max
(
q; max
2B
j
n
z()q
s()
o
)
For each rm j, we are interested in the eciency in the social planner's problem, q
sp
j , and eciency
in a pairwise equilibrium. These satisfy the following three equations:
q
sp
j = max

sup
c2C1
q(c); sup
N2N
max
c2CN
qN(c)qN

; w:p:1
q
pw
j  sup
N2N
max
c2CN
qN(c)qN
q
pw
j  q
sp
j ; w:p:1
These can be interpreted as follows: First, the chain with the maximum feasible eciency available
to the planner is either an innite chain or a nite chain that ends with the furthest rm upstream
using the outside option. Second, in any pairwise stable equilibrium, the eciency of a rm must
be at least that of any nite chain that ends with a rm using its outside option q. If otherwise, at
least one of the rms in that chain is must be using a suboptimal technique. Third, eciency in a
pairwise stable equilibrium must be feasible. The rst and third equations are satised only with
probability one because the planner may deviate from the maximum feasible eciency for a set of
rms with measure zero.
The remainder of the proof follows broadly along the same lines as Appendix C with some
minor modications. As a result I will only provide a sketch, pointing out the dierences. We can
construct an operator in the same manner as before:
Tf(q) 
8
<
:
0; q < q
e
 ~ 

1 
R 1
0 f

(
q
z)
1


dH(z)

; q  q
63We can also dene three functions.
f(q) 

0; q < q
1; q  q
f1(q) 

0; q < 1
1; q  1
 f(q) 
(
0; q < q2
1  

q
q2
 
; q  q2
With the additional restriction that q2 > q.
Let F be the subset of  F dened by ffj  f  f  fg. In the same manner as before, we can
show that T  f   f and Tf  f. This means that there is a least and greatest xed point of T in
F, given by limN!1 TN  f and limN!1 TNf respectively.
Dene YN  max ^ NN maxc2C ^ N
Q ^ N 1
n=0 q(c)q
^ N
. With this we can dene variables XN 
max
n
YN;maxc2CN
QN 1
n=0 q(c)
o
and  YN  max
n
YN;maxc2CN
QN 1
n=0 q(c)~ q(c)No
, where ~ q(c) is
a random variable drawn independently for each c in CN for each realization of . The CDFs of
XN,  YN, and YN are TNf1, TN  f, and TNf respectively.
Let Xsp  limN!1 XN and Xpw  limN!1 YN In the same manner as before we can show that
these limits exists and that with probability 1 we have both Xsp = qsp and Xpw  qpw  Xsp.
Lastly, we can show that Fsp is the unique xed point of T on F, and is the CDF of both Xsp and
Xpw. Applying the law of large numbers gives Qsp = Qpw.
F Multiple Inputs
Fraction of tasks that deliver eciency no greater than v is K(v):
K(v) = e
 ~ 
R 1
0
h
1 F

(
v
z)
1=i
dH(z)
Since q =
QN
n=1 v
1
N
n , we the cross sectional distribution of eciency F(q) is
F(q) =
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
K
 
qN
QN
n=2 vn
!
dK (v2)dK (v3):::dK (vN)
We now impose the parametric assumptions H(z) = 1   (z=z0)
  and ~  = z
 
0 . This gives
K(v) = e
 
R 1
z0
h
1 F

(
v
z)
1=i
z  1dz
= e v  R (v=z0)1=
0 [1 F(r)]r 1dr
Taking a limit as z0 ! 0 gives
K(v) = e v 
where  = 
R 1
0 [1   F(r)]r 1dr
64Next, we solve for . To do this we can rewrite F(q) as (using the substitution wn = v
 
n )
F(q) =
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e (qN=
QN
n=2 vn)
 
v
  1
2 e v
 
2 dv2:::v
  1
N e v
 
N dvN
=
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e (q )
N
=
QN
n=2 wne w2dw2:::e wNdwN
so that the density is
F0(q) =
1
q
N

q 
N Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e (q )
N
=
QN
n=2 wne w2 dw2
w2
:::e wN dwN
wN
We can take the expression for , integrate by parts, and substitute in for F0 to get
 = 
Z 1
0
[1   F (r)]r 1dr
= 
Z 1
0
F0 (r)rdr
= 
Z 1
0
1
r
N

r 
N Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e (r )
N
=
QN
n=2 wne w2 dw2
w2
:::e wN dwN
wN
rdr
Making the substitution u = (r )
N
QN
n=2 wn, this becomes
 = 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e ue w2 dw2
w2
:::e wN dwN
wN
u1  
N
 
N Y
n=2
wn
!1  
N du
u
=  

1  

N
N
Aggregate productivity Q can be computed as follows:
Q" 1 =
Z 1
0
q" 1dF(q)
=
Z 1
0
q" 11
q
N

q 
N Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e (q )
N
=
QN
n=2 wne w2 dw2
w2
:::e wN dwN
wN
dq
Making the substitution u = (q )
N
QN
n=2 wn and this becomes
Q" 1 = 
" 1

Z 1
0
 
N Y
n=2
wn
!1  " 1
 =N
u
1  " 1
 =N
Z 1
0
:::
Z 1
0
e ue w2 dw2
w2
:::e wN dwN
wN
du
u
= 
" 1
  

1  
("   1)=
N
N
65so that aggregate productivity is
Q =  

1  
("   1)=
N
 N
" 1

1
(1 ) 

1  

N
N 1
(1 )
F.1 Number of Customers
Given eciency qi, eciency that a single technique that uses that good delivers eciency less
than by a technique is probability that a v is H

v
q
i

, with density 1
q
i H0

v
q
i

. The probability
that the potential buyer has no other techniques better than v is simply K(v) (more properly, the
probability is
K(v) e ~ 
(1 e ~ )
R 1
0 F

(
v
z)
1=
dH(z)
which converges to K(v) as z0 ! 0). So the probability that
a technique is the potential buyer's best is
R 1
0
1
q
i H0

v
q
i

K(v)dv. Since the number of potential
buyer's follows a Poisson distribution with mean N~ , the number of actual buyers is Poisson with
mean:
N~ 
Z 1
0
1
q
i
H0

v
q
i

K (v)dv ! N
Z 1
0
1
q
i


v
q
i
  1
e v 
dv
= N


q

i
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